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ABSTRACT 
This paper sheds light on the impact sustainable and unsustainable corporate practices have on 
equity financing. We present a unique framed field experiment in which professional private 
equity investors competed in closed auctions to acquire fictive firms. We hence observe that 
corporate non-financial performance impacts firm valuation and investment decision and we 
quantify to which extent. Main result is an asymmetric effect, entrepreneurs having more to lose 
from unsustainable practices than to gain from sustainable ones. Our findings are discussed in 
terms of practical implications for both investors and firm managers. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The academic community has acknowledged that the past half-century wide gains in global 
economic development and human wealth creation has been achieved at the cost of 
environmental degradation, jeopardizing the sustainability of our economic systems (the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005; Dean and McMullen, 2007). In search for green 
growth foundations, an expanding body of literature investigates the role sustainable 
entrepreneurship can play (Cohen and Winn, 2007; Dean and McMullen, 2007; Zahra et al., 
2009). Hall et al. (2010) review this academic field and underline research paths left open, such 
as the conditions under which entrepreneurs can pursue sustainable ventures, or the limits to 
entrepreneurs’ potential for creating sustainable economies. Our paper contributes to this 
literature by shedding light on the impact both sustainable and unsustainable corporate practices 
have on private equity financing. We indeed ask whether investors support sustainable 
entrepreneurs by preferentially providing them with the equity needed to ensure their growth.  
Most research focused on developing the ‘business cases’ for sustainable development (Parrish, 
2010), that is motivating and legitimating firms’ sustainable orientations by potential profit 
making. Indeed, the impact of corporate social performance on economic performance has been 
largely studied in the business and economic literature (e.g. Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky 
et al., 2003; Crifo and Ponssard, 2010). In the most extensive literature meta-analysis up-to-date, 
Margolis et al. (2009) conclude on the existence of a small, positive and significant relationship 
between firm financial and social performance. However, drivers and causality of this 
relationship are ambiguous and not well understood (Horváthová, 2010; Surroca et al., 2010). 
This paper argues that the equity market reaction to corporate sustainable orientations is likely to 
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be profit-oriented. Therefore, understanding how corporate social performance is perceived by 
investors in terms of value creation is not trivial for academics and remains core for 
entrepreneurs, including for sustainability entrepreneurs as defined by Parrish (2010)
1
. 
Hereby we take the standpoint of focusing specifically on how sustainable (or socially 
responsible) and unsustainable (or socially irresponsible) practices can respectively create and 
destroy firm value, that is create or destroy profits for the firm shareholders. More specifically, 
we aim at providing entrepreneurs with a quantified measure of whether their efforts to manage 
the “triple bottom line, that is balancing economic health, social equity and environmental 
resilience” (see Kuckertz and Wagner, 2009) is rewarded by investors in terms of firm value and 
investment attractiveness. The literature highlights that entrepreneur’s engagement in sustainable 
practices may be profit-motivated, morally motivated or ethically grounded (see e.g. Bryant, 
2009; Harris et al., 2009). Here, whatever their original motivations, we explore how 
entrepreneurs may have a strong rationale for wanting to know whether engaging their firm on a 
sustainable path will create or destroy its market value and whether it will ease or not their access 
to equity. 
Firm value aggregates a large quantity of information on the company’s past, current and future 
cash flows and assets, both tangible and intangible. Many factors, often not directly available to 
researchers
2
, interweave in real life to build firm value, making it difficult to isolate the sole 
contribution of extra-financial performance in standard empirical analysis. A first research path 
consists in analyzing listed firms, whose values publicly result from stock market consensus. In 
                                                          
1
 Parrish (2010) opposes conventional entrepreneurs to sustainability entrepreneurs. The former « view enterprises as 
a means of profiting from the exploitation of resources, with the underlying logic of using resources for one's own 
advantage to generate maximum financial returns in the shortest time possible ».The latter « view enterprises as a 
means of perpetuating resources, with the underlying logic of using human and natural resources in a way that 
enhances and maintains the quality of their functioning for the longest time possible ». 
2
 Examples of such factors include expected cash flows, management quality and intangible assets. 
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this line, the socially responsible investment literature (see Renneboog et al., 2008 for a review) 
provides interesting insights using event studies (Takeda and Tomozawa, 2008) and empirical 
comparisons of socially responsible to conventional portfolio performance (Van de Velde et al., 
2005; Galema et al., 2008).  
However, the backbone of our economies consists in non-listed firms
3
, for which no public price 
is available. The novelty of our approach is to provide an original analysis based on experimental 
economics, allowing us to quantify the contribution of sustainable practices to the value of non-
listed firms. The experimental setting we rely on enables us to simplify the investing environment 
and control the information that grounds firm-value to focus on sustainability impact. The 
robustness of our methodology is grounded in the firm valuation expertise of the participants in 
our experiment.  
Indeed, our experiment involves professional Private Equity investors (including both venture 
capital and buyouts specialists). Our motivation to recruit these specific investors was threefold. 
First, their business is to value and invest in unlisted firms, in particular small and medium size 
enterprises. On a theoretical level, they have been identified as highly efficient at maximizing 
shareholders’ value by reducing information asymmetry (Jensen, 1986, 1989), monitoring the 
companies they select (Holmstrom and Tirole, 1997) and evaluating them better than a standard 
financial institution would (Ueda, 2004). Second, several authors pointed out that they already 
include in their valuation and investment decision non-financial criteria identified as core for 
business in the long run, such as the quality of management (Muzyka et al., 1996) or governance 
                                                          
3
 Unlisted firms have been shown to differ from public corporations, for instance in terms of capital structure 
(Romano et al., 2001) and shareholders protection (Loderer and Waelchli, 2010). They also undergo different 
legislation on extra-financial performance disclosure than public corporations. They encompass the large body of 
small-and-medium size enterprises (SMEs), which are the largest GDP contributor and employer in Europe (Ecorys, 
2011), and differ in their CSR from public corporations (Jenkins, 2004; Lepoutre and Heene; 2006). 
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(Kaplan and Strömberg, 2009; Wright et al., 2009), in particular for family firms (Dawson, 
2009). Third, many entrepreneurs turn to Private Equity investors to get access to capital. 
Analyzing whether sustainable and unsustainable practices matter for those key investors in terms 
of firm valuation and investment decision is therefore a core issue in itself for entrepreneurs. 
Hence we present a framed field experiment with Private Equity investors and infer from their 
expertise explicit measures of over and underperformance in terms of sustainable practices. We 
formalize sustainable practices as corporate social responsibility and decompose it into its three 
main pillars: Environment, Social and Governance (ESG) factors. Along each factor, we consider 
that the firm can implement either sustainable or unsustainable practices (sign, either positive or 
negative for society). Finally, we distinguish policies that are core for the business and mobilize 
resources (hard) from policies which are peripheral (soft), following a dichotomy suggested by 
Hannan and Freeman (1984) and Nicholls-Nixon et al. (2000). Our experimental design thus 
enables a focus on these three dimensions of corporate practices: factor (ESG), sign (positive, i.e. 
sustainable, or negative, i.e. unsustainable) and quality (soft or hard). 
Thirty three investors were involved in first-price sealed-bid auctions with embarrassment cost, a 
mechanism we formalize to demonstrate that it enables price revelation. Investors competed to 
acquire fictive firms based on case studies carefully built to ensure realism and credential context. 
Investors were provided with accounting and financial information, together with non-financial 
information as the experiment progressed. We intentionally manipulated the non-financial details 
in order to obtain investors’ valuation revision for each factor, sign and quality independently.  
Our results on 330 observations highlight that non-financial performance matters for equity 
financing. We control for investor heterogeneity and observe that firm valuations and investment 
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decisions are both impacted by the factor (ESG), sign (sustainable or unsustainable) and quality 
(hard or soft) of corporate practices, and we quantify to which extent. Main finding is the 
existence of an asymmetrical effect of non-financial performance, entrepreneurs having more to 
lose from unsustainable practices than to gain from sustainable ones. We conclude that 
unsustainable corporate policies might both prevent equity financing and increase its cost, 
sustainability thus consisting in a defensive strategy to protect firm value and equity access.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the experimental design, 
procedures used and the incentive mechanism of the first-price auction with embarrassment cost. 
Results are presented in Section 3 and their practical implications for investors and entrepreneurs 
are discussed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes by suggesting potential research extensions.  
 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN AND PROCEDURES 
We first present our experiment design in section 2.1 before detailing procedures in section 2.2. 
The experiment was built and conducted in partnership with professional associations
4
 in order to 
ensure realism, credent context and participants’ involvement. It is designed to quantitatively 
measure investors’ pricing of corporate sustainability based on first-price sealed-bid auctions 
with embarrassment cost. We discuss the choice of this auction mechanism and prove that it is 
incentive compatible in section 2.3.  
 
 
                                                          
4
 The Sustainable Club of the French Private Equity Association provided financial, technical and logistic support to 
build the case studies, recruit participants and run the experimental sessions. We affirm that our research was 
conducted in full independence and that our professional partners neither interfered in our study nor in our results. 
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2.1 Design 
The design encompasses four treatments based on three fictive case studies carefully built with 
professional Private Equity investors. Each treatment uses two case studies and evaluates a 
different set of extra-financial performance in terms of factor, sign, and quality.  
Factor deals with the focus of the policy, which can target any of the multiple actions 
encompassed in corporate social responsibility, from waste reduction to proactive human 
resources. Following business and academic practices in use
5
, we categorize corporate policies 
within the three pillars of corporate social responsibility: Environment (E), Social (S) and 
Governance (G). Sign can be positive (+) or negative (-), meaning that the firm respectively over-
performs (sustainable practices) or underperforms (unsustainable practices) its industry non-
financial performance standards on a given factor. Finally, the corporate practice can either be 
core for the firm business (“hard practice”) or peripheral (“soft practice”), defined by the bearing 
on firm resource mobilization (Hannan and Freeman, 1984; Nicholls-Nixon et al., 2000). We 
qualify this property as the corporate practice quality and refer to it as “hard” (++ or --) or “soft” 
(+ or -).  
Each of the three case studies corresponds to a fictive firm that needs Private Equity financing. 
Various industries, firm sizes and financial performances (investment attractiveness) are used 
across cases. Table 1 summarizes the characteristics of the case studies, which are detailed in 
Appendix A. Each case study uses two different factors with different signs. For each factor and 
sign (for instance: sustainable environmental policy), we always evaluate the effects on investors’ 
                                                          
5
 For business and market practices in use, the reader can refer to the United Nations Principles for Responsible 
Investing (http://www.unpri.org), US SIF (http://ussif.org/) and EUROSIF (http://www.eurosif.org/); for academic 
literature reviews on corporate social responsibility and socially responsible investments to Crifo and Ponssard 
(2010), Reinhardt et al. (2008), Renneboog et al. (2008). 
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decisions of successively a soft practice (e.g. energy saving at the holding building level) and a 
hard practice (e.g. change in the production process to reduce toxic waste). We thus measure the 
effects of a soft practice, a hard practice, and the total cumulative impact of both, which we 
assimilate to the effect of a global policy.  
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
Treatments combine case studies in order to independently test investor decisions when 
confronted to various extra-financial performance levels. Treatments 1, 2 and 3 test all 
combinations of factors and signs. Treatment 4 ensures that the sequence of information sign 
(learning first about the firm’s sustainable practices and then about its unsustainable ones; or the 
reverse way) does not impact investors’ decisions. Figure 1 displays the experiment design and 
details the information evaluated by participants in each treatment.  
(Insert Figure 1 about here) 
 
2.2 Procedures 
Participants were recruited by professional association emailing and directly registered online. 
We run one session per treatment (hence four sessions) with 6 to 11 participants. Treatments 1 to 
3 were conducted in the French Private Equity Association office; treatment 4 was conducted via 
an internet website for participants who could not attend the previous sessions. The 33 
participants were all professional Private Equity investors (their profile is detailed in section 3.1). 
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In each session, the sequence of events was as follows. First, participants signed an agreement 
form that ensured anonymity and confidentiality. They were explained the rules of the 
experiment (available in Appendix C). They were given the first case study, similar in its format 
and content to a real business deal offer. Data provided encompassed business description, 
history, key market indicators, accounting data, business-plan with expected future cash-flows, 
comparable transactions and multiples, and a firm price benchmark based on different weighted 
average cost of capital. After analyzing this information, investors wrote down their firm 
valuation and whether they wanted to invest or not in it. 
Once all investors in the session had done so, new extra-financial information was progressively 
given to them, as would occur in an auditing process. They sequentially received four new pieces 
of extra-financial information of different sign, quality and, factors (see Figure 1, steps 1 to 5). 
For each new piece of information, participants could either revise their firm valuation and 
investment decision or not. Altogether, each investor thus valued five times the first case study. 
Our interest lays in the change of decisions between the first valuation (our baseline) and the four 
decisions that follow. Investors could also write comments on their decisions, providing us with 
qualitative data. 
Once the first case study was completed, the second case study was given to the investors and the 
same rules applied (steps 6 to 10). We thus gathered 330 observations (330 firm valuations and 
330 investment decisions) as well as detailed qualitative data. Once the second case study was 
completed, participants fulfilled a short questionnaire eliciting their socio-economic 
characteristics, understanding, strategy, ESG training, beliefs on ESG factors as well as intrinsic 
preferences such as risk aversion (full questionnaire is available in Appendix D). On average, 
sessions lasted about 90 minutes. 
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2.3 Incentive Mechanism 
The experimental design is based on first-price sealed-bid auctions with embarrassment cost. We 
here discuss the efficiency of this mechanism at revealing investors’ true firm valuation. In a 
first-price sealed-bid auction, each investor independently submits a single bid without seeing 
others’ bids. The firm is sold to the bidder who makes the highest bid (the winner), who pays her 
bid. First-price sealed-bid auctions with a limited amount of bidders (“controlled sales”) are a 
widespread bidding process among Private Equity investors (Boone et al., 2009, Fidrmuc et al., 
2012). Deal values usually stay private information and research on the topic thus often resorts to 
survey data (Hsu, 2004). First-price sealed-bid auctions have been well documented both 
theoretically (Klemperer, 2004, p.12) and experimentally (for a survey see Kagel, 1995). Two 
downsides of our experimental auction need offsetting: obviously, there is no actual firm to 
acquire in our experiment; and conversely, participants would not be asked to spend large 
amounts of cash. The auction game is therefore built to psychologically trigger participants’ price 
revelation.  
First, to ensure saliency, we use a twofold incentive: (i) a monetary incentive, as the winner can 
earn a prize equivalent to 120€ (which consisted in three bottles of Champagne from a French 
luxury brand); and (ii), a reputational incentive, as the auction winner is announced publicly. 
Second, to offset the absence of monetary cost for the auction winner, we rely on the 
embarrassment of winning with too high a bid that was identified by Klemperer (2002). Beyond 
cash flow waste, winning with too high a bid causes embarrassment cost as it suggests 
incompetence. We spur further this embarrassment cost in a threefold way: (i) our case studies 
provide investors with a common price range for the firm valuation (depending on their choice of 
Weighted Average Cost of Capital; see Appendix A), which they can use as a benchmark; (ii) the 
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winner’s firm valuation is made public, so that all participants know if the winning bid is too 
high; and (iii), we introduce a penalty in the first-price sealed bid auction. Indeed, if the winner’s 
bid is too high, we openly state that she made a “bad deal” and she loses her prize. A winning bid 
is defined as “too high” if it exceeds 10 percent of the market consensus, calculated as the median 
of all valuations
6
.  
Drawing on Klemperer (2004, p. 68), we formalize the first-price sealed-bid auction with 
embarrassment cost and demonstrate that this mechanism enables the revelation of investors’ true 
firm valuation. We consider n risk-neutral investors
7
 whose firm valuations vi are independently 
drawn from the uniform distribution on [0,1], with distribution function denoted by F(v) and 
density function denoted by f(v). With a uniform distribution on  vv;  we have
)/(1)(),/()()( vvvfvvvvvF  .  
Investor i's utility    from winning the auction with bid bi equals: 
  
jiiii bmbkbvu       (1) 
where vi denotes her true firm valuation, m(bj) the median of all j bids, and the term proportional 
to parameter k reflects the embarrassment of winning with too high a bid, that is disutility for a 
                                                          
6
 The choice of the median is based on perceptions within the sector as well as the 10 percent interval that 
corresponds to the estimated bargaining on the real market. 
7
 Klemperer (2004, p.19) notes that in first-price auction, risk-aversion makes bidders bid more aggressively. Risk 
aversion in first-price auction has received major attention by the experimental community: for a recent contribution 
showing the limits of over-bidding, see Neugebauer and Perote (2008). In our experiment, participants appear fairly 
risk-neutral (see section 3.1 and Appendix B, figure B.3). 
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winner to lose the monetary prize and to be known to make a bad deal. A non-winner's utility is 
zero
8
. 
We are going to determine the players’ expected payments and the equilibrium bidding strategies. 
Let denote by )~(vb  the bidding strategy that player i is supposed to follow in the equilibrium of 
the game induced by the incentives mechanism ( v~ denotes the corresponding type of player i). 
We denote by EUi bidder i's expected utility from behaving as type v
~  given her opponents. The 
expected payment of a bidder of type v~  is defined as the probability of winning the auction in the 
equilibrium (pi( v
~ )), times the expectation of ui conditional on the remaining (n-1) values being 
below v~ :  ijvvuEvpEU jiii  ,~)~( . 
In any mechanism which always gives the object to the highest-value bidder in equilibrium, the 
probability of winning the auction is simply pi( v
~ )=(F( v~ ))n-1, with F(.) the distribution function, 
since a bidder’s probability of winning is the probability that all the other (n-1) bidders have 
lower values than she does. With a uniform distribution on [0,1], we have F( v~ )= v~ , therefore pi(
v~ )= v~ n-1. EUi then writes:  
   ijvvbmEvbkvbvvEU jjini   ,~)()~()~(~ 1     (2) 
Bidder i's optimal bidding choice of v~  satisfies 0~/  vEU i  
that is: 
   
    0,~)(~/)~(')~('~
,~)()~()~(~)1(
1
2




ijvvbmEvvbkvbv
ijvvbmEvbkvbvvn
jj
n
jji
n
    (3) 
                                                          
8
 In the basic analysis of optimal auctions, revenue equivalence and marginal revenues apply (see Klemperer, 2004).  
In a framework in which the object always goes to the buyer with the highest value and bidders with lowest values 
expect zero surplus, any mechanism that allocates a unit among the bidders yields the same expected revenue. 
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To simplify our computations and obtain analytical results, we assume following Klemperer 
(2004, p.215) that there is a linear equilibrium so that: b(v)= ×v. We are searching for the 
equilibrium bidding strategy b(v), which in a linear equilibrium amounts to determining the 
equilibrium value of . Equilibrium bidding strategies are symmetric Nash equilibrium in which 
a bidder with value v chooses the bid b(v). Consider that player i with value v deviates and 
chooses the bid b
~
, and let v~  be the type of bidder she would just tie with, that is : bvb
~
)~(  . 
Mimicking v~  would beat all the other (n-1) bidders with probability 1))~(( nvF  and yield 
expected surplus to player i 
1))~(()~,(  nvFvvEU . Choosing the best bid to make is thus 
equivalent to choosing the best v~  to mimic which is computed as the first-order condition
0~/  vEU i . In turn, for the bidding function b(v) to be an equilibrium, i’s best response to all 
others bidding according to this function must be to do likewise, that is, her optimal choice of b
~
 
is b(v) and of v~  is v. We thus have ivv 
~  in our (symmetric Nash) equilibrium. 
Conditional on vi being the highest value, the other n-1 values are uniformly distributed on [0, vi] 
so, using the property of the uniform distribution, the expected value of the median of these 
(which is what i would expect to pay conditional on winning) is vi/2:  
   2/, iijj vijvvbmE       (4) 
Using b(v) = ×v and  ivv 
~   and substituting for equation (4) into equation (3) , we get: 
0
2
1
2
)1( 12 























   kv
v
vkvvvn ni
i
iii
n
i    (5) 
That is we obtain the following equilibrium bidding strategy b(vi)= ×vi with: 
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 k
k
n
n








 1/
2
1
      (6) 
And bidder i's unconditional expected utility is given by 
   nvvvkvvvEU niiiii
n
ii /2/
1        (7)  
 
The result of this simple first-price auction with embarrassment cost shows that EUi is 
independent of k. Since the highest type wins, the lowest type makes zero surplus. For all k, the 
other conditions for revenue equivalence are satisfied and the bidders are equally well off.  
What matters for the experiment is that when the embarrassment cost (k) increases, the 
equilibrium bidding strategy (b(vi)) converges toward the median valuation (vi/2). In other words, 
the risk of winning the auction with too high a bid depresses investors’ firm valuations towards 
the market consensus. Assuming the reputational and monetary incentives we implemented are 
salient, the embarrassment cost is very high in the experimental auction. Therefore our first-price 
sealed-bid auction design enables the revelation of investors’ real firm valuation.  
 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
We first present participants’ main characteristics in section 3.1, then results on the impact of 
corporate extra-financial performance on investors’ firm valuation in section 3.2, before 
analyzing the impact on investment decisions in section 3.3. Table 2 summarizes descriptive 
statistics on experimental results. Full descriptive statistics, detailed by treatment and firm, can be 
found in Appendix E (Table E.1). 
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(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
3.1 Participants’ profile 
Following our questionnaire’s answers, participants in our experiment are professional and 
experienced Private Equity investors (39 years old in average). They work in different segments 
of Private Equity (venture and seed capital 33%, growth capital 24% and leveraged buyouts 
52%
9
) and at different posts (chairman 21%, partner 21%, investment director 12%, investment 
manager 40% and specialists of socially responsible investments 6%). 73% are men and 48% 
have received some kind of training on the management of ESG issues. Results of a simple 
lottery (see question 10 in Appendix D) allows us to estimate participants’ risk aversion. 
Compared to usual experimental participants (Holt and Laury 2002), they appear fairly risk-
neutral and less risk-averse than usual experimental participants (see figure B.3. in Appendix B). 
Detailed participant descriptive statistics can be found in Appendix B. In the following analysis, 
we control for investor heterogeneity using these variables.  
 
3.2 Results on Firm Valuation 
A first element worth noting is the consistency of firm valuation between sessions, which 
supports the expertise of our participants, the efficiency of the auction mechanism and the 
robustness of our results. Between sessions, Firm A base mean valuation was 151.8 M€ with a 
35.2M€ standard error (that is 23%); 37.8M€ with a 6.9 M€ standard error (18%) for firm B; and 
                                                          
9
 Some participants worked in two segments, explaining why total exceeds 100%. 
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514.8M€ with a 114.3M€ standard error for firm C (23%) (see Table 2). 70% of the winners 
received their prize for firm A and 50% for firm B and C, meaning most winning valuations were 
within 10% of the median valuation. Also supporting results consistency, we can note that most 
valuations (respectively 67%, 100% and 63% valuations for firms A, B and C) were within the 
firm valuation range we had provided in the case studies (see Appendix A). 
For the remainder of the analysis, we focus on the relative change in investors’ firm valuation 
between information steps (in %) rather than the absolute firm valuation (in M€). The 
heterogeneity of investors’ valuations in Step 1, that is based on sole financial data, is therefore 
controlled for in the analysis. Table 3 presents the mean of the relative change in investors’ firm 
valuation depending on factor, sign and quality. Statistical significance of the observed changes 
is assessed by the p-values yielded by the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test, which 
compares the mean of the relative valuation change to zero. Figure 2 summarizes these data.  
(Insert Figure 2 about here) 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
Descriptive statistics (Table 2) and the results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests on the mean 
changes in firm valuation (Table 3) indicate that sustainable and unsustainable practices all 
impact firm valuation whatever their factor, sign and quality.
10
 Unsustainable environmental, 
social and governance policies (cumulating soft and hard practices) appear to significantly 
decrease investors’ firm valuation by respectively 11.6%, 10.5% and 15.3% (all p-values <0.01); 
whereas sustainable ones only increase it by 5.0%, 5.5% and 2.0% (all p-values < 0.05) (Table 3). 
                                                          
10
 Only the impact of positive hard governance practice is not significant at the level of 10%. 
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Most of the unsustainable policy effect appears driven by hard (that is core for the business) 
practices.  
However, heterogeneity in investors’ socio-economic characteristics, experience and preferences 
may affect their decisions and bias those results. To control for this heterogeneity and for the 
repetition of valuations for each investor, we use panel regression models and econometrically 
analyze the effects of sustainable corporate policy (Table 4) and unsustainable corporate policy 
(Table 5) on firm valuation change depending on factor and quality. In both tables, models 1 and 
2 are GLS models with random effects in which investors’ age, gender, specialty (venture capital; 
buyouts; expansion capital; socially responsible investments), and training on ESG issues 
management are controlled for. We also control for the order in which the case studies were 
given as well as whether the session was run on the internet or not. Models 1’ and 2’ are panel 
regression models with fixed effects, hence directly controlling for investors’ heterogeneity, and 
are used as robustness check. Models 1 and 1’ explain the firm valuation change between rounds 
1 – 3, 3 – 5, 6 – 8 and 8 – 10 and test the effects of corporate policy Factor (ESG). They thus 
provide estimates of the cumulative effect of hard and soft practices on a given factor. Models 2 
and 2’ explain the firm valuation change between each round and estimate the crossed effects of 
Factor and Quality. They thus distinguish the effects of soft and hard practices for any given 
Factor. As a robustness check, table E.2. in Appendix E provides other estimations using crossed 
effects of Sign, Factor and Quality. 
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(Insert Table 4 about here) 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
 
Let us first focus on the effects of sustainable practices on firm valuation change (Table 4). 
Sustainable environmental and social policies (cumulating soft and hard practices) led to a 
significant increase in firm value of respectively 4.7% and 5.4% in Model 1; 4.6% and 5.9% in 
Model 1’ (all p-values<0.01). Positive Governance has no significant impact in our data. We now 
distinguish core from peripheral practices (Models 2 and 2’, Table 4). Once sustainable policies 
are separated into soft and hard practices, the effects that remain significant are the effect of hard 
environmental practice (3.2% and 3.1% in Model 2 and 2’, p-value<0.01) and the effect of soft 
positive social practice (3.8% in Model 2 and 4.1% in Model 2’, p-value<0.01). In all random-
effect models, investors’ intrinsic characteristics do not have significant effects on firm valuation 
change. 
Let us now focus on the effects of unsustainable practices on firm valuation change (Table 5). 
Unsustainable environment, social and governance policies (cumulating soft and hard practices) 
respectively decrease firm value by -11.2%, -10.6% and -15.1% in Model 1; and -11.7%, -10.7% 
and -14.6% in Model 1’ (Table 5; all p-values<0.01). When we separate the effects of soft and 
hard practices (Models 2 and 2’), we find that both significantly reduce firm value, but hard 
practices have a significant larger impact (tests of equality between coefficients for each Factor: 
p-value<0.05). Soft unsustainable practices decrease firm value by -3.5% (p-value<0.05), -3.1% 
(p-value<0.10), and -5.7% (p-value<0.01) for respectively environment, social and governance 
issues in Model 2 (-3.8%, -3.1% and -5.3% in Model 2’), whereas hard unsustainable practices 
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respectively lead to a -8.2%, -8.0% and -9.9% decrease in Model 2 (all p-values<0.01; decrease 
of -8.5%, -8.1% and -9.6% in Model 2’).  
Three investors’ intrinsic characteristics appear to impact their change in firm valuation when 
they learn about unsustainable practices: gender, Private Equity segment and specialization in 
socially responsible investments. Change in firm valuation is less important for women than for 
men (+3.6%, model 1, p-value<0.05). A close look at data reveals that they do not increase their 
firm valuation when they learn about unsustainable practices, but rather have a smaller reaction 
than men. Growth expansion investors penalize more strongly firm value than investors 
specialized in venture capital or buyouts (-3.5%, model 1, p-value<0.10). Finally, the two 
socially responsible investments specialists of our sample also have a stronger reaction (-11.4%, 
model 1 p-value<0.01).  
To summarize, results show that unsustainable corporate policies significantly decrease firm 
value whereas sustainable ones significantly increase it (except for governance), yet with a lesser 
magnitude. 
 
3.3 Results on investors’ investment decisions 
Let us now focus on the impact of corporate policies on investment decisions. Table 2 presents 
the mean change in investment decision depending on corporate practice factor, sign and quality, 
that is the share of investors (in %) who revise their previous decision and either stop or start 
investing in the firm when they learn about its sustainability performance. As for mean change in 
firm valuation, statistical significance of the observed changes is assessed by the p-values yielded 
by the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test.  
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In our experiment, unsustainable policies (cumulating both soft and hard practices) reduce the 
investment likelihood by respectively -29.2%, -50.0% and -30.8% for environment, social and 
governance issues (p-values<0.01, Table 2). Most of the effects seem driven by hard practices, 
governance put apart. For all factors, soft practices do not stand out as sufficient to influence the 
decision to invest. Sustainable policies do not appear to significantly increase the investment 
decision, except for environment (+10.4%, p-value<0.10; Table 2).  
As for firm valuation, the decision to invest or not in a firm depends on investors’ heterogeneity 
in terms of preferences and style. To explain investment decision while controlling for this 
heterogeneity, we use random-effect logistic model (Model 3) in Table 6 (a fixed-effect model 3’ 
is tested as a robustness test and presented in table E.3 in Appendix E). Controls in Model 3 are 
similar to those used to explain the relative change in firm valuation in Tables 4 and 5. As 
estimates cannot be directly interpreted, predictive margins are calculated. They provide the 
predicted probabilities of deciding to invest knowing the Factor and Quality of the corporate 
practice, assuming the random effect is zero (i.e. for an average investor). 
(Insert Table 6 about here) 
 
Results confirm that only unsustainable practices significantly change the investment decision. 
They also confirm that only hard unsustainable practices matter in this regard for environmental 
and social issues (both p-value<0.01). Governance stands out, both soft (p-value<0.10) and hard 
(p-value<0.01) unsustainable practices reducing the investment decision (p-value<0.01). 
Predictive margins also highlight that, among the ESG factors, governance has the largest impact 
on the investment decision in terms of magnitude.  
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4. DISCUSSION 
Experimental findings show that corporate sustainability impacts Private Equity investors’ firm 
valuation and investment decision. However, sustainable and unsustainable policies 
asymmetrically affect Private Equity financing, entrepreneurs having more to lose from the latter 
than to gain from the former. We also observe that investors care for the content of the corporate 
sustainability policy: Environmental, Social and Governance issues do not equally matter, 
Governance appearing specific. The quality of the corporate practice (whether it is core (hard) or 
peripheral (soft) for the firm) also matters.  
Our results are consistent with earlier studies (on listed firms) showing that companies with better 
ESG performance tend to face significant lower capital constraints. El Ghoul et al. (2011) show 
for instance that investment in responsible employee relations and environmental policies 
contributes substantially to reducing firms’ cost of equity, whereas participation in “sin” 
industries (tobacco and nuclear power) increases firms’ cost of equity.  
We discuss in this section the consequences of our results for investors and entrepreneurs, taking 
into account qualitative data. Indeed, many participants (20 out of 33) wrote down the 
justifications of their valuations and investment decisions, shedding light on their understanding 
and use of the ESG criteria in Private Equity. 
 
4.1 Sustainability and Private Equity investors 
A first element worth noticing is that most investors integrated the extra-financial information in 
standard financial tools. For instance, they estimated the cost of upgrading poor environmental 
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management systems and impacted that cost in the firm business plan and future cash flows. Cost 
estimations were often approximated, investors indicating they would require additional auditing 
to confirm their valuation. Poor extra-financial performance thus enabled them to lower the firm 
price during the acquisition stage. However, numerous comments indicated that they expected to 
be able to generate profits by improving this poor extra-financial performance. Conversely, 
sustainable practices already implemented were not expected to create additional value. As put by 
a participant, they were “considered intrinsic to quality management and expected by the board”. 
Investors’ qualitative comments also pointed out that our estimation of unsustainability impact on 
investment decisions (about -30%) is likely biased upward by our experimental design. Indeed, 
most investors would not actually have rejected the investment (as they did in the experiment, as 
they had no alternative), but would have rather asked for complementary audits and dues 
diligences in a real investment. Whereas the high rejection rates we observed might be 
overestimated, unsustainable practices appear likely to increase Private Equity investors demands 
in terms of dues diligences and eventually shareholders’ pact. 
Our results also highlight that the content of the corporate sustainability policy matters for 
investors, both in terms of quality and factor. The importance of the environment and social 
practice quality (soft or hard) appears in line with the pointed-out financial and quantitative 
approach of extra-financial performance by Private Equity investors. Indeed, hard practices in our 
experiment were designed to be core to the firm business, bearing on resource mobilization, 
hence having stronger accounting impact. Among the ESG factors, governance stands out as 
having strong effects on firm valuation and investment decision when negative (for both soft and 
hard practice), and none when positive. Governance is indeed a specific issue in the Private 
Equity industry. As significant shareholders, Private Equity investors are usually deeply involved 
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in the firm governance, when they do not have complete control of the board. Kaplan and 
Strömberg (2009) also identify governance engineering as a major strength of the industry. 
Whereas good governance might not be paid for during the acquisition stage because it is 
expected, a firm poorly governed might be a risk well understood and to which investors strongly 
react.  
For the Private Equity industry, the ability to properly evaluate the extra-financial performance of 
a target firm could thus constitute a negotiation tool in acquisition stages to lower its cost, thus 
increasing the investment profitability. Also, it could enable Private Equity investors to create 
value in the companies they already hold in portfolio. However, succeeding in doing so requires a 
specific human capital on corporate social responsibility management, which the industry might 
likely still be in lack of. 
 
4.2 Sustainability and Entrepreneurs 
Let us now consider consequences for entrepreneurs. Our results imply that unsustainable 
practices are likely to prevent access to Private Equity financing, particularly when they represent 
sufficient a risk to threaten the core business. For instance, food-safety issues due to poor 
environmental management in our catering case-study (firm A) decreased investment decisions 
by about 30%. As previously discussed, in real investments, this rejection rate might be 
overestimated. However, poor management of environmental and social issues would likely 
increase investors’ demands in terms of audits and dues diligences, which are costly.  
Core business issues put apart, unsustainable firms are likely to get financed as much as 
sustainable ones. However, low extra-financial performance appears to be used to lower the firm 
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valuation, meaning it increases the cost of equity capital for entrepreneurs and destroys their 
shareholders’ value. Improving environmental, social and governance practices could thus allow 
entrepreneurs to protect their firm price and access to Private Equity capital. Environmental and 
social performance might even be paid for by investors when it strengthens the firm 
attractiveness. 
Let us finally note that the quantification approach used by investors implies the need for 
entrepreneurs to implement indicators to assess and monitor environmental, social and 
governance performance. Indeed, considering Private Equity investors’ growing concern for 
extra-financial performance (Crifo and Forget, 2012), it appears likely that such quantified 
information will be increasingly required. To be paid for, sustainability will hence likely need to 
be accurately and quantitatively demonstrated.  
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper tackled the core question of the impact of corporate sustainable and unsustainable 
practices on Private Equity financing. We find that entrepreneurs who engage their company on a 
sustainable path might not be more attractive for Private Equity investors than the others. 
However, we provide evidence that entrepreneurs who do not manage environmental, social and 
governance issues are likely to suffer limited access to Private Equity, with a higher cost of 
capital, hence penalizing their shareholders by destroying firm value. Indeed, when investors’ 
heterogeneity is controlled for, our results unveil that unsustainable policies decrease firm price 
by respectively 11%, 10% and 15% for environmental, social, and governance issues.  
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Several research paths are opened by our results and we here shed light on three of them. A first 
path arises from our experiment focus on deal pricing, discarding issues about control rights. As 
several experiment participants highlighted, unsustainable practices might lead to reinforced dues 
diligences rather than price change. The issue of the impact of corporate sustainability on control 
rights in Private Equity financing negotiations is left open to investigate and is likely to be of 
broad interest for entrepreneurs.  
Another research avenue is triggered by the asymmetry we highlighted in the pricing of 
sustainable and unsustainable policies. Indeed, it remains unclear whether investors strategically 
overweighed unsustainability to lower firm price in acquisition stages, or whether they actually 
overvalued extra-financial risks (potential losses) over opportunities (potential gains). Whereas 
the former could be explained by negotiation strategy and empirically tested by observing exit 
stages, the latter would rather relate to behavioral finance concepts, such as prospect theory 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979).  
Finally, a research path is drawn by our focus on the Greening Goliaths rather than the Emerging 
Davids identified by Hockerts and Wustenhagen (2010), that is firms engaging in incremental 
environmental or social process innovation (such as through corporate social responsibility 
initiatives) rather than new sustainable entrepreneurships. Investigating how Emerging Davids 
would be evaluated by venture and seed capitalist compared to Greening Goliaths appears as a 
promising research extension to the sustainable entrepreneurship literature.  
From a wider perspective, equity financing remains a core limit of entrepreneurs who wish to 
pursue sustainable ventures. Venture capital likely has a key role to play in such 
entrepreneurships, yet its extent is a question left open. Research is still needed to analyze how to 
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raise the equity needed and what are the best organizational structures to finance green growth 
and support Emerging Davids.  
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Fig.1. Experiment design. Four treatments were tested. Two case studies were done by treatment, using information 
on Environmental (E), Social (S) or Governance (G). Information is either positive (+) or negative (-), and either 
soft (+ and -) or hard (++ and --). Each participant underwent the 10 steps of information of a single treatment. 
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Fig.2. Mean impact (%) of corporate sustainable (Positive “++”) and unsustainable (Negative “- -“) practices on 
investors’ firm valuation depending on the policy Factor: Social (left), Governance (middle) and Environment (right) 
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Table 1 
Characteristics of the three case studies used in the experiment 
Case 
Study 
 Sector  Number of 
Employees 
 Factor  Sign Quality Policy 
Firm A  Catering  1600  Social  + soft Employee training & career 
development 
      hard Working conditions & 
remuneration 
   Environment  - soft Environmental footprint 
monitoring 
      hard Environmental performance 
of supply chain 
           
Firm B  Packaging  227  Environment  + soft Environmental footprint 
monitoring 
      hard Eco-design 
   Governance  - soft Organization of authority 
delegation 
      hard Organization of board of 
directors 
           
Firm C  Electronic 
Components 
 2608  Governance  + soft Organization of authority 
delegation 
      hard Organization of board of 
directors 
   Social  - soft Employee training & career 
development 
       hard Working conditions & 
remuneration 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics on experimental results 
a
 
Firm  Corporate practice  Valuation (M€)  Investment decision 
(%) 
  factor Sign & 
quality 
Obs.  Mean 
b
 
 
Median. Min. Max.  Mean 
b
 
 
A  Base  24  151.8 (35.2) 160.0 81 242  0.75 (0.44) 
  Social + 24  151.1 (35.2) 160.0 81 220  0.75 (0.44) 
   ++ 24  152.2 (35.6) 162.5 81 220  0.71 (0.46) 
  Env - 24  150.0 (34.7) 160.0 81 220  0.75 (0.44) 
   - - 24  137.5 (27.4) 137.5 81 180  0.46 (0.51) 
              
B  Base  26  37.8 (6.8) 38.2 20 50  0.65 (0.49) 
  Env. + 26  36.6 (8.3) 37.9 15 50  0.69 (0.47) 
   ++ 26  37.9 (9.4) 39.3 15 58  0.81 (0.40) 
  Gov. - 26  37.3 (8.0) 37.5 20 56  0.61 (0.50) 
   - - 26  33.8 (8.9) 33.0 15 50  0.46 (0.51) 
              
C  Base  16  514.8 (114.3) 500.0 280 747  0.94 (0.25) 
  Gov. + 16  522.8 (119.3) 505.0 280 747  0.94 (0.25 
   ++ 16  526.7 (124.7) 506.5 280 750  1.00 (0.00) 
  Social - 16  508.2 (114.7) 497.5 280 740  0.88 (0.34) 
   - - 16  467.5 (117.3) 450.0 275 700  0.50 (0.52) 
a 
Provided by firm case study (A, B or C) and by corporate practice Factor (Environment, Social or Governance), 
Sign and Quality (+ = sustainable soft practice; ++ = sustainable hard practice; - =  unsustainable soft practice; -- = 
unsustainable hard practice). Base (italic figures) is the first investment round, in which investors’ decisions are 
taken based on sole financial data.  
b
 Figures in brackets are standard errors. 
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Table 3 
Experimental effects of corporate policies on the mean changes in firm valuation and investment decision 
a 
 
Factor Sign
b
 Quality # obs. Mean change in firm 
valuation (%) 
c
 
Mean change in investment 
decision (%) 
c
 
Environment Negative  24 -11.57 ***  -29.17 *** 
  Soft - 24 -3.36 * 0.00  
  Hard -- 24 -8.08 *** -29.17 *** 
        
 Positive  26 4.95 *** 11.54 * 
  Soft + 26 1.69 ** 0.00  
  Hard ++  26 3.20 *** 11.54 * 
        
Social Negative  16 -10.47 ** -50.00 *** 
  Soft - 16 -2.98 ** -12.50  
  Hard -- 16 -7.95 ** -37.50 ** 
        
 Positive  24 5.49 *** -4.17  
  Soft + 24 3.95 ** -4.17  
  Hard ++ 24 1.48 ** 0.00  
        
Governance Negative  26 -15.26 *** -30.77 ** 
  Soft - 26 -5.80 *** -15.39      
  Hard -- 26 -10.07 *** -15.39  
        
 Positive  16 2.03 ** 6.03  
  Soft + 16 1.43 ** 0.00      
  Hard ++ 16 0.60  6.03      
a 
Mean relative change in respectively firm valuation and investment decision when investors learn about corporate 
extra-financial performance, depending on the corporate practice Factor (Environment, Social or Governance), Sign 
(Negative, i.e. unsustainable; or Positive, i.e. sustainable) and Quality (hard or soft practice). 
b
 The mean change in firm valuation and investment decision calculated by Sign (italic) represents the cumulative 
effect of both the soft and hard practices, that is the effect of a global sustainable or unsustainable policy.  
c
 Statistical significance is given by Wilcoxon signed-rank test (H0: Mean of change = 0): *** p<0.001; ** p<0.005 
* p<0.010  
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Table 4 
Effects of corporate sustainable policies on the change in firm valuation 
a
 
 
Model 1 
b
 Model 1’ d Model 2 c Model 2' d 
Env 4.74 *** (1.21) 4.59 *** (1.26)       
Soc 5.38 *** (1.25) 5.85 *** (1.31)       
Pos 2.48  (1.48) 2.01  (1.57)       
Env x soft       1.66 * (0.98) 1.57  (1.01) 
Env x hard       3.18 *** (0.98) 3.08 *** (1.01) 
Soc x soft       3.73 *** (1.02) 4.05 *** (1.05) 
Soc x hard       1.30  (1.01) 1.61  (1.05) 
Gov x soft       1.79  (1.19) 1.47  (1.24) 
Gov x hard       0.97  (1.19) 0.65  (1.24) 
Case study order 0.53  (0.92) 0.56  (0.95) -0.45  (0.62) 0.20  (0.63) 
Internet session 0.42  (1.35)    0.35  (0.90)    
Investor age 0.02  (0.05)    0.01  (0.03) 
   
Investor gender -0.76  (1.09)    -0.47  (0.72) 
   
Venture capital 0.31  (1.78)    0.20  (1.18) 
   
Buyout 0.54  (1.53)    0.35  (1.01) 
   
Expansion capital -0.24  (1.47)    -0.17  (0.98) 
   
SRI 5.40  (2.67)    3.69  (1.77) 
   
ESG training -0.47  (0.95)    -0.30  (0.63) 
   
Obs. 132   132   198   198 
  
Nb. investors 33   33   33   33   
Wald chi2 39.11 ***     31.99 ***     
F-test    6.88 ***     3.00 ***  
R² (within) 0.22   0.22   0.12   0.12 
  
a
 We only test here the effects of policies of Positive Sign. Model 1 and 1’ use the change in firm valuation (%) 
between rounds 1, 3 and 5. Model 2 and 2’ use all rounds. Sustainable corporate policy effects are decomposed into 
factor (Env., Social or Gov.) and quality (soft or hard). Figures in brackets are standard errors. * p-value< 10%; ** p-
value< 5%;  *** p-value< 1 
b  
Model 1 is a GLS model with random effects. Global effects (soft and hard practices cumulated) are estimated.  
c 
 Model 2 is a GLS model with random effects. Effects of hard and soft practices are distinguished.  
d 
 Model 1’ and 2’ are panel regression models with fixed effects. 
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Table 5 
Effects of corporate unsustainable policies on the change in firm valuation 
a
 
 
Model 1 
b
 Model 1’ d Model 2 c Model 2' d 
Env -11.20 *** (1.80) -11.65 *** (1.83)       
Soc -10.56 *** (2.11) -10.66 *** (2.17)       
Gov -15.09 *** (1.72) -14.61 *** (1.75)       
Env x soft       -3.47 ** (1.48) -3.79 ** (1.49) 
Env x hard       -8.19 *** (1.48) -8.51 *** (1.49) 
Soc x soft       -3.06 * (1.73) -3.11 * (1.77) 
Soc x hard       -8.04 *** (1.73) -8.08 *** (1.77) 
Gov x soft       -5.64 *** (1.43) -5.32 *** (1.44) 
Gov x hard       -9.91 *** (1.43) -9.59 *** (1.44) 
Case study order 0.13  (1.32) 0.00  (1.31) 0.09  (0.90) -0.03  (0.90) 
Internet session -2.17  (1.94)    -1.47  (1.39)    
Investor age 0.13 * (0.07)    0.09 * (0.05) 
   
Investor gender 3.56 ** (1.56)    2.47 ** (1.12) 
   
Venture capital -2.95  (2.56)    -2.26  (1.83) 
   
Buyout -2.25  (2.19)    -1.73  (1.57) 
   
Expansion capital -3.49 * (2.12)    -2.56 * (1.51) 
   
SRI -11.36 *** (3.83)    -8.74 *** (2.74) 
   
ESG training 0.26  (1.36)    0.26  (0.97) 
   
Obs. 132   132   198   198 
  
Nb. investors 33   33   33   33   
Wald chi2 128.81 ***     101.25 ***     
F-test    24,95 ***     10.21 ***  
R² (within) 0.51   0.51   0.31   0.31 
  
a
 We only test here the effects of policies of Negative Sign. Model 1 and 1’ use the change in firm valuation (%) 
between rounds 1, 3 and 5. Model 2 and 2’ use all rounds. Unsustainable corporate policy effects are decomposed 
into factor (Env., Social or Gov.) and quality (soft or hard). Figures in brackets are standard errors. * p-value< 10%; 
** p-value< 5%;  *** p-value< 1 
b  
Model 1 is a GLS model with random effects. Global effects (soft and hard practices cumulated) are estimated.  
c 
 Model 2 is a GLS model with random effects. Effects of hard and soft practices are distinguished.  
d 
 Model 1’ and 2’ are panel regression models with fixed effects. 
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Table 6 
Effects of corporate sustainability policies on investment decision 
a
 
 Sustainable practices  Unsustainable practices 
 
Model 1
 b  
 Predictive 
Margins 
 Model 1
 b  
 Predictive 
Margins 
 
Env x soft -0.76 
 
(0.87) 0.74 *** 
 
0.37 
 
(0.75) 0.86 *** 
 
Env x hard 0.86 
 
(0.95) 0.87 *** 
 
-1.84 *** (0.66) 0.50 *** 
 
Soc x soft -0.27 
 
(0.83) 0.79 *** 
 
0.77 
 
(1.02) 0.90 *** 
 
Soc x hard -0.26 
 
(0.83) 0.79 *** 
 
-2.26 *** (0.81) 0.41 *** 
 
Gov x soft 2.06 
 
(1.35) 0.94 *** 
 
-1.25 * (1.67) 0.61 *** 
 
Gov x hard
 d
 21.85 
 
(15270) 1.00 *** 
 
-2.27 *** (0.69) 0.41 *** 
 
          
  
 
Case study order -0.12 
 
(0.59) 
   
0.44 * (0.43)   
 
internet session -4.49 ** (1.28) 
   
-1.52 
 
(1.17)   
 
investor age -0.11 
 
(0.09) 
   
0.00 
 
(0.04)   
 
investor gender 0.66 
 
(1.74) 
   
-1.07 
 
(0.94)   
 
venture capital -2.70 
 
(2.48) 
   
-1.16 
 
(1.48)   
 
buyout -4.92 ** (2.37) 
   
-2.37 * (1.30)   
 
expansion capital -2.46 
 
(1.94) 
   
-1.14 
 
(1.25)   
 
SRI -5.27 
 
(3.42) 
   
-2.53 
 
(2.21)   
 
ESG training 2.55 
 
(1.54) 
   
0.30 
 
(0.80)   
 
Obs. 198 
     
198 
  
  
 
Nb. investors 33 
     
33 
  
  
 
Wald chi2 11.77 
     
23.17 * 
 
  
 
log_likelihood -61.53           -96.89         
a
 Effects of sustainable (Sign = positive) and unsustainable (Sign = negative) corporate policies on the investment 
decision (0 = don’t’ invest; 1 = invest) depending on their Factor (Env., Social or Gov.) and Quality (soft or hard). * 
p-value< 10%; ** p-value< 5%;  *** p-value< 1 
b  
Model 3 is a random effects logistic regression.  
c 
 Predictive margins are the predicted probability of deciding to invest knowing the Sign, Factor, and Quality, 
assuming the random effect is zero (i.e. that it is an average investor). 
d
 All observations  = 1 when Factor =  Governance, Sign = Positive and Quality = Hard 
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APPENDIX A - Case studies used in the experiment
11
 
 
CASE STUDY OF FIRM A 
Business summary 
Firm A is a restaurant chain that employs over 1600 workers. All chain concepts, products and marketing tools apply 
to all restaurant units, empowering Firm A with a strong and visible brand image.  
Along 17 other French restaurant chains, Firm A belongs to a restaurant sample group. Firm A stands as n°1 in terms 
of turnover growth in 2008, 2009 and 2010. It over-performed the market throughout the crisis, increased its turnover 
by +1.9% from 2008 to 2007 (market -1.8%) and only suffered a -0.2% loss from 2009 to 2008 when the market 
underwent -6.1%.  
The average meal cost is lower than in its restaurant chain competitors. Moreover, the VAT reduction was passed on 
the average meal cost (- 3.5% from 2009 to 2010), in line with the special agreement for the restaurant industry 
(« Contrat d’avenir de la restauration »). The « fish and seafood » product benefits from a positive image in terms of 
nutritional quality. Those elements provide Firm A with a popularly-positioned price/product ratio, half-way between 
rapid and basic lunch catering and evening or weekend family dinner.  
Three categories of establishments exist: downtown restaurants; mall restaurants, and « solo » restaurants, a growing 
category with a strong visual impact. On November 30, 2010, Firm A counts 74 establishments (12 in Paris, 26 en 
Paris region, 36 in other French regions). 9 openings are forecasted in 2011 and 8 in 2012. Full growth potential is 
estimated at 150 establishments in France.  
For several years, Firm A has been engaged in an aggressive marketing policy (budget of 2% of turnover). Finally, 
Firm A had been managed by a high-quality top team for the past five years.  
 
Financial Information  
 
Business plan 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
  
       Turnover 
       % growth 
       EBITDA 
        % turnover 
       EBIT 
        % turnover 
        
 
 
 
BALANCE SHEET (k€)    2008   2009   2010 
Turnover 
                                                                
11
 Translated from French. Original French version available upon request. Note that in the French version, ESG 
information were visually similar in terms of number of lines.  
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% change A-1 turnover restaurants 
      Raw material costs 
      Gross Profit 
      % gross profit restaurants 
      Personnel costs - Restaurant 
     Other costs - Restaurants 
      Gross Operating Income 
      % margin restaurants 
      Building rental costs 
     % margin restaurants 
      Head office costs 
      Gross Operating Profit -Total 
     % margin      
      
Operating Capex: About 4 M€/year (openings put apart), which is in the industry average in turnover %. 
 
Comparables Transactions Multiples 
  EBITDA Multiples 
Max  
 Min 
 Average 
  
 
Comparable 
Firms   
Stock 
price (€)   
Market 
Cap (€)   
Firm 
Value (€) 
Multiple 
Turn./LTM 
Multiple 
EBITDA/LTM 
Multiple 
EBIT/LTM 
X 
            Y 
            Z 
            ..... 
             
Average Stock Market Multiples 
  Mult Turn. Mult EBITDA Mult EBIT 
Max  
   Min 
   Average 
    
DCF information:  
 
WACC baseline:    Firm value 150 M€ 
Risk premium increase:     Firm value 130 M€ 
Risk premium decrease:     Firm value 170 M€ 
 
Information Steps 
Information 1:  
Firm A Board of Directors is strongly involved in Human Resources Management, particularly for employee 
training.  
In 2010, 95% restaurant employees were trained, including e-learning trainings (for management, kitchen and dining 
room workers). Trained employees benefited in average from 0.63 training day in 2010, against a 0.20 industry 
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average. A “Challengers program” was implemented in 2009 to train future managers (Directors and Deputy 
Directors) over 18 months. Annual appraisals are formalized, with regular skill assessment for team managers.  
In 2010, 191 employees (that is 11%) were granted an internal promotion against 56 (4%) in 2009. Employee 
promotion led to an average wage increase of +6%.  
Information 2:  
Firm A commits to ensure that the greatest value is attached to work and skills and therefore especially targets wage 
increase and working condition improvement.  
Wages are in the high range of the chain restaurant industry, with performance incentives based on quantitative and 
qualitative objectives. In 2010, Firm A raised the salary scale higher that demanded by the collective agreements. 
Since 2008, wages systematically increased by +2 to +3%, while the inflation increased by about 1.5%. 92% workers 
have permanent contracts, against a 64% industry average. Working conditions have been improved with the 
installation of skylights in the dishwashing area and a reduction of the cook stove heat.  
Employee turnover was reduced from 130% in 2000 to 42% in 2010. Work stoppages (WS) decreased by 1 WS/ 
13 000 worked hours in 2009 to 1 WS/15 500 in 2010. Finally, shirking decreased from 7.3% in 2009 to 4.3% in 
2010. 
Information 3:  
Firm A did not implement a voluntary policy of environmental footprint reduction. 
The carbon footprint is not evaluated. Water, gas and electricity consumptions are not monitored by restaurant unit. 
Monitoring and implementing water and energy savings are not included in 2011 targets. Paper consumption for 
marketing and head office activities are not well-documented. New buildings do not follow the High Environmental 
Quality standards. There is no restaurant waste reduction policy and few recycling practices have been implemented.  
Global energy and water consumptions increased between 2009 and 2010. Waste management deteriorated from an 
average 5.42 waste liters / consumer in 2009 to 5.78 liters in 2010.  
Information 4:  
Firm A does not possess any supplier chart with environmental guidelines and does not audit its key raw material 
suppliers (including shellfish suppliers) on those issues. 
A European directive recently implemented water classification criteria for shellfish production based on Escherichia 
coli bacteria concentration. Only Area A –produced shellfish can directly be sold for human consumption. 100% 
shellfishes sold by Firm A are produced in Area B, meaning human consumption is only allowed after sufficient 
treatment in a purification center.  
The IFREMER national research center has shown that some pollutants (including heavy metals) and toxins 
(including endocrine disrupters) are not eliminated in the purification process.  
 
CASE STUDY OF FIRM B 
Business summary 
Firm B produces packaging solutions for the agri-food industry. It has a twofold expertise: packaging and cooking 
products; and a twofold trade: processing and distributing its products. It currently employs 227 workers.  
Firm B is the French leader on its niche market (144 M€ in total size), with 35% market shares on its segment (over 
50% in specialized segments). The agrifood paper/cardboard industry market has a strong resilience (relative 
certainty of yield, small risk), that follows in volumes the agrifood product consumption. The market slightly 
decreased in volumes in 2008-2009 (-5% to -7%) due to the crisis, but should return to growth thanks to the 
population growth (0.5%/year). Firm B customers are wholesalers; large retailers (distribution channel well managed 
and with little competition); and large catering industrials.  
Following the financial crisis, Firm B focused on maintaining a satisfactory level of profitability and underwent two 
years of activity decrease in 2008 and 2009 (-4.6%). Retailer price pressure exists but remains relatively limited, 
even though some competitors did several concessions over the period to maintain their volumes.  
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Since 2009, Firm A has undertaken a market consolidation with a focus on growth market segments and 
diversification thanks to external growth. In 2010, it acquired the tangible and intangible assets of a small promising 
packaging industrial, hence improving Firm B visibility in the industry, including at an international level. Salesmen 
have an active and substantial presence worldwide to defend Firm B markets. Despite decreasing results, Firm B 
acquires more than ever new clients and signs new contracts, developing profitable outlets. To sustain its aggressive 
action plan, an official growth-marketing position was created in 2010, giving Firm B new impetus. Firm A image is 
in the process of modernizing and this evolution creates a gap with its usual competitors.  
Despite the crisis, Firm B has thus demonstrated its strength as a non-volatile asset to build portfolio long-lasting 
value.  
 
Financial Information 
Similar to Case A (different values) 
 
 
DCF information:  
 
WACC baseline:    Firm value 38.2 M€ 
Risk premium increase:     Firm value 33.4 M€ 
Risk premium decrease:     Firm value 44.5 M€ 
 
 
Information steps 
Information 1:  
Firm B implemented a policy to manage its environmental footprint. 
Indicators were set up to monitor water, gas, electricity and paper consumptions and carbon emissions. A physical-
chemical pre-treatment process for industrial water effluents was installed in 2000. A product waste (including toxic 
waste) monitoring system was also implemented. Finally, a policy of selective waste sorting and recycling is 
currently being installed.  
Water and energy consumptions decreased in 2009 (-3%) and 2010 (-7%). 66% waster was recycled in 2010, against 
55% in 2009.  
Information 2:  
Firm B diversified into the ecodesign segment and now produces and commercializes products with reduced 
environmental footprint.  
In terms of ecodesign, Firm B invested to develop products that optimize raw materials (basis weight and/or 
packaging thickness reductions) and decrease toxic waste (use of vegetal inks, reduction of harmful volatile organic 
compounds). In 2009, Firm B launched the fabrication and sale of 100% labeled FSC product mix (label of 
sustainable and responsible forest management, delivered by an independent NGO).  
In 2010, 72% cardboard and 33% paper supplied are FSC (respectively + 24% and + 12% compared to 2009), so 
without additional cost. The new product targets retailers, includes 20% less materials, without affecting the product 
quality.  
Information 3 
Firm B did not clearly formalize the organization and structure of authority delegation.  
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The current functional organization chart dates back to 2009 and has not been regularly updated. Authority 
delegation is not clearly established. No operational committee exists (management board, audit board, safety 
committee, sustainable development committee...) to formalize the firm strategic decisions. Audits and internal 
controls are not part of the corporate culture.  
Most information on Firm B governance thus arises from dialog with its manager. Decision making is not 
participatory.  
Information 4  
Firm B is currently managed by Mister Z., CEO since 1991. His family founded the Firm in 1874.  
Mister Z has a deep understanding on the firm’s memory, background, know-how and key industrial and commercial 
account management. He largely supports the new Firm B growth-marketing strategy, influenced the recruitment in 
2010 of Mister L. as head of the growth-marketing department, and follows its evolution.  
For reasons of ill health, Mister Z. decided to retire starting from January the 1st, 2012. No successor is currently 
anticipated. Mister L. recently announced his resignation.  
 
CASE STUDY OF FIRM C 
Business summary 
Firm C creates, produces and retails electronic components at the world scale. Its products are used in sensitive 
industries such as transport (airplanes, trains, aerospace). It currently employs 2608 workers. 2010 saw substantial 
increase in large contracts on new products.  
Firm C is known for its important history in electronic components, with a worldwide market and production plants 
in Europe (4) and Asia (2) and commercial offices in Europe (4), Asia (2), the United States (2), and a network of 
salesmen in over 30 countries. Firm C encompasses a holding and a subsidiary company per production plant.  
Due to the wide range of equipment and country-specific norms, the number of Firm C products is particularly 
important. Firm C markets are resilient despite a relatively low growth (about 1%/year). The competitive dynamics is 
in favor of Firm C, whose growth exceeds the market growth (including gains in market shares). The electronic 
component market for specific industries has above-average operational demands. Components indeed need to last 
long (above 5 years) without major machinery failure, so in demanding environments (shocks, vibrations, 
temperature changes...). Firm C brands benefit from a quality track record and a good image.  
Firm C currently undergoes a high growth. In 2010, the firm achieved a 319.2 M€ turnover, that is +18,3% compared 
to 2009, with a 60,0m€ EBITDA (18,9% EBITDA margin). The 2011 budget shows a 335.2M€ turnover, that is a 
5.1% increase. Productivity gains allowed by the automation of part of the production process and cost savings in the 
Chinese production enable a 68.0m€ EBITDA forecast (20.2% turnover).  
The firm top management, mostly French, is acknowledged for its excellence. Over the past 5 years, it has been 
focusing on Firm C commercial growth, while keeping a tight hand on expenses. R&D efforts and upstream 
positioning on emerging products confirm Firm C management quality.  
The growth potential of Firm C remains important considering the potential gains in world market shares. In 
particular, there are strong expectations on the commercialization of new products meeting the modern safety 
requirements of upcoming norms, which will likely lead clients to renew their demanding equipment.  
 
Financial Information 
Similar to Firm A (different values) 
 
DCF information:  
 
WACC baseline:    Firm value 497.8 M€ 
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Risk premium increase:     Firm value 447.4 M€ 
Risk premium decrease:     Firm value 560.8 M€ 
 
Information Steps 
Information 1 
Firm C decided to implement new operational governance better involving its different subsidiaries.  
A supervisory board exists since several years. It encompasses a former Firm C top manager and investors and meets 
every three months. At the management level, chairman and CEO are distinct posts and those managers constitute a 
balanced trio with the Financial Officer. Monthly meetings with managers of subsidiaries abroad are organized and 
formalized.  
The Supervisory board members are highly satisfied by Firm C governance efficiency and their excellent 
relationships with the management.  
Information 2  
Firm C decided to increase the formalization of the organization with its subsidiaries.  
Following this decision, an organization chart was set up to clarify each subsidiary’s governance. Operational 
committees (commercial committee; R&D; Quality; industrial Production) were created at the holding level, 
gathering plant managers. Meetings between subsidiaries as well as between their departments (R&D; Quality; 
industrial Production) were also organized and formalized.  
Those structures enable Firm C to develop a more transversal and less hierarchical management, which particularly 
well suits its activity.  
Information 3  
Firm C does not display its human resources policy as being a priority.  
In terms of wages, Firm C is slightly lower than the industry average. Training programs implemented over the last 
four years focused on high-growth plant managers. The social dialog tensed over the last few months in two 
European production sites. Workers ask for a wage increase and a better management of their career in Firm C.  
Employee turnover increased by + 12% between 2008 and 2010 and work stoppages increased by + 6%.  
Information 4  
Firm C leaves its subsidiaries with as much freedom as possible regarding human resources management.  
Reports of the subsidiary meetings highlight that subsidiary Z in China has implemented a human resources policy 
which strongly differs from the other subsidiaries. In particular, it is underlined that employees work 10 to 12 hours a 
day, 6 days a week and work 80 to 200 extra hours monthly (whereas the regulation limits them to 36). A two-day 
strike occurred last month, workers asking for a wage increase and an improvement of their working conditions.  
The Southern Daily, a popular Chinese newspaper, just published its black list of the 20 worst multinational to work 
for in China, and Firm C appears among them. 
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APPENDIX B - Participants’ profile 
 
 
 
Fig. B.1. Distribution of participants by private equity specialty 
 
 
Fig. B.2. Distribution of participants by position in their private equity firms 
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Fig. B.3. Distribution of the risk aversion of participants in our field experiment, compared to laboratory experiment participants 
 
 
Table B.2. 
Descriptive statistics on participants’ profile (from questionnaire) 
 
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4 Full sample 
Variable (definition) Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Obs Mean Std. Dv. Min Max 
Number of participants 110 11 70 7 90 9 60 6 330 33 -   
Age 110 43.81 70 36.86 90 36.33 60 34.67 330 38.64 9.78 24.00 57.00 
Gender (=0 if man, 1 if woman) 110 0.45 70 0.29 90 0.22 60 0.00 330 0.27 0.45 0.00 1.00 
ESG training (= 1 if trained, 0 otherwise) 110 0.46 70 0.43 90 0.44 60 0.67 330 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Risk aversion 110 2.18 70 2.71 80 2.63 50 2.00 310 2.39 1.31 0.00 5.00 
Venture capital (= 1 if specialist, 0 otherwise) 110 0.27 70 0.14 90 0.56 60 0.33 330 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
Expansion capital  (= 1 if specialist, 0 otherwise) 110 0.09 70 0.43 90 0.44 60 0.00 330 0.24 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Buyouts  (= 1 if specialist, 0 otherwise) 110 0.64 70 0.57 90 0.33 60 0.50 330 0.52 0.50 0.00 1.00 
SRI  (= 1 if specialist, 0 otherwise) 110 0.09 70 0.00 90 0.00 60 0.17 330 0.06 0.24 0.00 1.00 
0%
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APPENDIX C - Experiment instructions
12
 
 
The experiment 
You will successively be given two firm case studies during the experiment. For each case study, you will receive 
additional information as the experiment goes on. You will have to value each firm several times, as additional 
information is provided. You will write down your firm valuation after each new piece of information. You will 
undertake several valuation rounds, for each case study. You are competing against the other participants to make a 
deal with each of those firms. You can earn a Prize depending on your decisions and the other participants’ decisions. 
This Prize consists in 3 bottles of Champagne. 
At the end of the experiment, a valuation round will be randomly selected for each case study. For the randomly 
selected valuation round, the participant who will have proposed the highest value for the firm will make the deal. 
However, the Winner will only receive the Prize if he or she made a « good deal », that is if the firm was not paid at 
too high a price. You are not allowed to communicate with the other participants throughout the experiment. You 
must keep confidential your firm valuations for each information round.  
 
What you are going to do in details  
A first case study will be handed over to you. The case study encompasses quantitative and qualitative information: 
business summary, business plan, firm history, balance sheet, comparable transactions, multiples and DCF. You will 
then value the firm for the first time and decide whether you want to invest in it or not. This is the valuation round 
n°1. You have 12 min to do so. A calculator is at your disposal would you need one. You will write down your firm 
valuation and investment decision on the valuation sheet (that we will shortly give you). We will then pick up your 
valuation sheet. 
A new piece of qualitative information (valuation round n°2) will be given to you. You can then choose either to 
change your first valuation and investment decision, or to keep to your first decisions. You can choose not to invest 
in the firm, but you still need to write down your valuation. You have 4 min to take those decisions. Three new pieces 
of qualitative information (valuation rounds n°3, n°4 and n°5) will successively be given to you in the same way. You 
will proceed for valuation rounds n°3, n°4 and n°5 as for valuation round n°2.For each case study, you will be thus 
asked five firm valuations. 
Once the first case study is completed by all, the second case study will be handed over to you, following the same 
rules. Once both case studies are completed, you will have to fill up a questionnaire. Finally, we will discover who 
the Winners are.  
 
Results and Winners: 
One Winner is identified for each case study. Thus there will be two Winners in this experiment. For each case study, 
a valuation round (n°1; n°2, n°3, n°4 or n°5) is randomly selected using a dice at the end of the experiment. The 
selected round will be used to identify who is the Winner for each case study. The Winner for each case study is the 
one who « made the deal » with the firm at the randomly selected valuation round. It is the participant who proposed 
the highest firm valuation and decided to invest in the firm at the selected round. The Winner will be known to all.   
The Winner only gets the Prize (3 bottles of Champagne worth about 120€) if he or she « made a good deal », that if 
he or she did not pay too high a price for the firm. If he or she paid too much for the firm (that is « made a bad 
deal »), then he or she loses the Prize. Whether the firm has been paid too much for or not is decided by the market 
consensus. The market consensus on the firm valuation is given by the median of all firm valuations proposed by 
participants (for this case study, at this selected round). If the Winner paid the firm more than 10% above the market 
consensus, the Prize is lost. If the Winner paid the firm less than 10% above the market consensus, the Prize is won. 
Whether the Winner keeps or loses the Prize is known to all.  
                                                          
12
 Translated from French. Original French version available upon request. 
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If there are several Winners for a given case study (ex aequo), a draw will be used to identify who keeps the Prize. 
You have a few minutes to read those instructions again. Please let us know would you have any question; we will 
privately answer them. When all participants will be ready, we will start the experiment. 
  
50 
 
APPENDIX D - Post-experimental questionnaire 
 
1. Do you agree with the following assertions? 
a. The study cases were very clear. 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
b. The study cases were comprehensive enough to give a valuation of the firm. 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
 
2. For case A, do you agree with the following assertions? 
a. You chose your valuation of the firm depending on your own judgment. 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
b. You chose your valuation of the firm depending on your anticipations on other participants’ judgment. 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
 
3. For case B, do you agree with the following assertions? 
a. You chose your valuation of the firm depending on your own judgment. 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
b. You chose your valuation of the firm depending on your anticipations on other participants’ judgment. 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
 
4. Please indicate the following information: 
a. Your age: _______________________________________________________________________ 
b. Your gender: ______________________________________________________________________ 
c. Your company: ________________________________________________________________ 
d. Your function in this company: ____________________________________________________ 
e. Your specialization (VC, LBO...): ______________________________________________________ 
 
ESG criteria are criteria that are used to evaluate how a firm takes into account environmental, social and 
governance impacts in its financial management. 
5. Did you receive training in your company about integration of ESG criteria into? 
a. your target analysis? 
  yes  no   
b. your due diligence contract? 
  yes  no 
c. your portfolio management? 
  yes  no   
 
6. Does your company have an ESG charter? 
  yes  no   
 
7. Would you say that the integration of ESG criteria is important for: 
a. LPs (Limited Partners) of your company? 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
b. stockholders of your company? 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
c. image of your company? 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
d. risk management of your company? 
 strongly agree   agree  neutral    disagree  strongly disagree 
 
8. In your job, negative news: 
a. about environmental practices has already led you to: 
  decrease the valuation of a target firm 
51 
 
  refuse to invest in a firm 
  negative news about environmental practices of firms has no impact on our decisions 
 
b. about social practices has already led you to: 
  decrease the valuation of a target firm 
  refuse to invest in a firm 
  negative news about social practices of firms has no impact on our decisions 
 
c. about governance practices has already led you to: 
  decrease the valuation of a target firm 
  refuse to invest in a firm 
  negative news about governance practices of firms has no impact on our decisions 
 
9. In your job, positive news: 
a. about environmental practices has already led you to: 
  increase the valuation of a target firm 
  accept to invest in a firm 
  positive news about environmental practices of firms has no impact on our decisions 
 
b. about social practices has already led you to: 
  increase the valuation of a target firm 
  accept to invest in a firm 
  positive news about social practices of firms has no impact on our decisions 
 
c. about governance practices has already led you to: 
  increase the valuation of a target firm 
  accept to invest in a firm 
  positive news about governance practices of firms has no impact on our decisions 
 
10. Please indicate for each decision if you choose option a of option b by ticking the corresponding box. 
 Your decision 
Decision 1 
Option a: 3 chances over 10 to win 2 € and 7 chances over 10 to win 1.6 € 
Option b: 3 chances over 10 to win 3.85 € and 7 chances over 10 to win 0.1 € 
 
Option a                      
Option b      
Decision 2 
Option a: 4 chances over 10 to win 2 € and 6 chances over 10 to win 1.6 € 
Option b: 4 chances over 10 to win 3.85 € and 6 chances over 10 to win 0.1 € 
 
Option a                        
Option b      
Decision 3 
Option a: 5 chances over 10 to win 2 € and 5 chances over 10 to win 1.6 € 
Option b: 5 chances over 10 to win 3.85 € and 5 chances over 10 to win 0.1 € 
 
Option a                        
Option b      
Decision 4 
Option a: 6 chances over 10 to win 2 € and 4 chances over 10 to win 1.6 € 
Option b: 6 chances over 10 to win 3.85 € and 4 chances over 10 to win 0.1 € 
 
Option a                        
Option b      
Decision 5 
Option a: 7 chances over 10 to win 2 € and 3 chances over 10 to win 1.6 € 
Option b: 7 chances over 10 to win 3.85 € and 3 chances over 10 to win 0.1 € 
 
Option a                        
Option b      
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APPENDIX E -Descriptive statistics and robustness checks 
 
Table E.1. 
Detailed descriptive statistics on experimental results by treatment 
Treatment  Valuation   Change in valuation   Investment decision  Change in investment decision 
Number Firm Factor Sign Obs.  Mean (M€)  Mean (%) Std. Er. Min. Max.  Mean (%)  Mean (%) 
1 A Base  11  166.82       90.91   
  Social + 11  169.82  1.92 2.99 0.00 8.55  90.91  0.00 
  Social ++ 11  171.91  1.20 1.43 0.00 3.13  90.91  0.00 
  Env. - 11  166.27  -3.28 6.24 -20.24 3.13  90.91  0.00 
  Env. - - 11  153.50  -7.26 8.74 -27.78 0.00  36.36  -54.55 
 B Base  11  38.06       63.64   
  Env. + 11  39.18  3.08 3.85 0.00 11.11  63.64  0.00 
  Env. ++ 11  40.01  2.17 3.98 0.00 13.51  90.91  27.27 
  Gov. - 11  38.48  -3.88 6.56 -21.05 0.00  63.64  -27.27 
  Gov. - - 11  36.42  -5.82 5.76 -16.29 0.00  36.36  -27.27 
                
2 C Base  7  458.29       85.71   
  Gov. + 7  460.00  0.34 0.73 0.00 1.96  85.71  0.00 
  Gov. ++ 7  459.71  -0.09 1.00 -2.17 0.00  100.00  14.29 
  Social - 7  453.00  -1.32 1.54 -4.00 0.00  71.43  -28.57 
  Social - - 7  432.14  -4.12 6.76 -18.60 0.00  28.57  -42.86 
 A Base  7  133.71       71.43   
  Social + 7  135.14  0.96 1.32 0.00 3.03  71.43  0.00 
  Social ++ 7  138.14  2.51 3.62 0.00 10.00  71.43  0.00 
  Env. - 7  137.00  -0.75 1.29 -2.89 0.00  71.43  0.00 
  Env. - - 7  129.00  -6.68 7.02 -16.67 0.00  57.14  -14.29 
                
3 B Base  9  40.68       77.78   
  Env. + 9  40.84  0.38 0.95 0.00 2.86  77.78  0.00 
  Env. ++ 9  43.44  5.90 5.95 0.00 16.00  77.78  0.00 
  Gov. - 9  40.19  -8.15 4.70 -16.67 -2.10  66.67  -11.11 
  Gov. - - 9  36.41  -9.60 8.56 -23.81 0.00  44.44  -22.22 
 C Base  9  558.78       100.00   
  Gov. + 9  571.56  2.27 3.61 0.00 8.40  100.00  0.00 
  Gov. ++ 9  578.83  1.14 3.09 0.00 9.38  100.00  0.00 
  Social - 9  551.11  -4.26 8.03 -17.14 11.27  100.00  0.00 
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  Social - - 9  495.00  -10.92 11.42 -38.20 0.00  66.67  -33.33 
                
4 A Base  6  145.33       50.00   
  Env. - 6  135.33  -6.54 9.04 -23.08 0.00  50.00  0.00 
  Env. - - 6  116.67  -11.21 11.72 -31.82 0.00  50.00  0.00 
  Social + 6  131.67  11.17 18.55 0.00 46.67  33.33  -16.67 
  Social ++ 6  132.5  0.79 1.94 0.00 4.76  33.33  0.00 
 B Base  6  33.17       50.00   
  Gov. - 6  30.83  -5.79 9.18 -20.45 0.00  50.00  0.00 
  Gov. - - 6  25.00  -18.56 10.74 -28.57 0.00  66.67  16.67 
  Env. + 6  25.33  1.11 2.72 0.00 6.67  66.67  0.00 
  Env. ++ 6  25.67  1.04 2.55 0.00 6.25  66.67  0.00 
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TABLE E.2. 
 Effects of corporate sustainable and unsustainable policies on the change in firm valuation – robustness check a 
 
Model 1 
b
 Model 1
 d
  Model 2 
c
 Model 2' 
d
 
Pos. x Env (global) 4.88 *** (1.79) 5.09 *** (1.89)        
Neg x Env (global) -11.16 *** (1.86) -11.12 *** (1.97)        
Pos x Soc (global) 5.36 *** (1.85) 5.40 *** (1.96)        
Neg x Soc (global) -10.24 *** (2.18) -10.65 *** (2.33)        
Pos x Gov (global) 2.26  (2.18) 1.85  (2.33)        
Neg x Gov 
(global) 
-15.32 *** (1.79) -15.12 *** (1.89)        
Pos x Env x soft        1.73  (1.40) 1.89  (1.43) 
Pos x Env x hard        3.25 ** (1.40) 3.40 ** (1.43) 
Neg x Env x soft        -3.51 ** (1.44) -3.53 ** (1.48) 
Neg x Env x hard        -8.24 *** (1.44) -8.25 *** (1.48) 
Pos x Soc x soft        3.79 *** (1.44) 3.78 ** (1.48) 
Pos x Soc x hard        1.33  (1.44) 1.32  (1.48) 
Neg x Soc x soft        -2.81 * (1.69) -3.04 * (1.75) 
Neg x Soc x hard        -7.78 *** (1.69) -8.01 *** (1.75) 
Pos x Gov x soft        1.59  (1.69) 1.36  (1.75) 
Pos x Gov x hard        0.77  (1.69) 0.54  (1.75) 
Neg x Gov x soft        -5.75 *** (1.40) -5.60 *** (1.43) 
Neg x Gov x hard        -10.02 *** (1.40) -9.87 *** (1.43) 
Case study order 0.65  (1.13) 0.71  (1.18)  -0.13  (0.69) -0.13  (0.71) 
Internet session -1.16  (1.65)     -0.67  (1.00)    
Investor age 0.10  (0.06)     0.06 * (0.04) 
   
Investor gender 1.87  (1.32)     1.20  (0.80) 
   
Venture capital -1.75  (2.17)     -1.24  (1.31) 
   
Buyout -1.14  (1.86)     -0.83  (1.12) 
   
Expansion capital -2.49  (1.80)     -1.64 ** (1.08) 
   
SRI -3.98  (3.24)     -3.04  (1.95) 
   
ESG training -0.14  (1.15)     -0.03  (0.69) 
   
Obs. 198   198    330   330 
  
Nb. investors 33   33    33   33   
Wald chi2 191.84 ***      188.77 ***     
F-test    23.83 ***      12.96 ***  
R² (within) 0.51   0.51    0.37   0.37 
  
a
 Model 1 and 1’ use the change in firm valuation (%) between rounds 1, 3 and 5. Model 2 and 2’ use all rounds. 
Corporate policy effects are decomposed into factor (Env., Social or Gov.), sign (Positive or Negative) and quality 
(soft or hard) and crossed effects are estimated. * p-value< 10%; ** p-value< 5%;  *** p-value< 1 
b  
Model 1 is a GLS model with random effects. Global effects (soft and hard practices cumulated) are estimated.  
c 
 Model 2 is a GLS model with random effects. Effects of hard and soft practices are distinguished.  
d 
 Model 1’ and 2’ are panel regression models with fixed effects. 
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Table E.3. 
Effects of corporate sustainability policies on investment decision – robustness check a 
 
Model 3 
b
 
 
Model 3’ d  
  Estimates 
 
Predictive margins
 c
   Estimates   
Pos x Env x soft -0.80 
 
(0.73)  0.71 *** (0.11) 
 
-0.84 
 
(0.74) 
 
Pos x Env x hard 0.43 
 
(0.83)  0.86 *** (0.08) 
 
0.45 
 
(0.89) 
 
Neg x Env x soft 0.37 
 
(0.80)  0.85 *** (0.09) 
 
0.49 
 
(0.86) 
 
Neg x Env x hard -2.08 *** (0.72)  0.49 *** (0.13) 
 
-2.05 *** (0.71) 
 
Pos x Soc x soft -0.06 
 
(0.77)  0.81 *** (0.08) 
 
0.00 
 
(0.81) 
 
Pos x Soc x hard -0.09 
 
(0.77)  0.80 *** (0.10) 
 
-0.03 
 
(0.81) 
 
Neg x Soc x soft 0.93 
 
(1.05)  0.90 *** (0.08) 
 
0.92 
 
(1.08) 
 
Neg x Soc x hard -2.44 *** (0.84)  0.43 *** (0.15) 
 
-2.28 *** (0.80) 
 
Pos x Gov x soft 2.03 
 
(1.31)  0.96 *** (0.05) 
 
1.96 
 
(1.27) 
 
Pos x Gov x hard
 e
 22.91 
 
(26832.8)  1.00 *** (0.00) 
 
16.35 
 
(1184.48) 
 
Neg x Gov x soft -1.44 ** (0.71)  0.60 *** (0.12) 
 
-1.49 ** (0.72) 
 
Neg x Gov x hard -2.58 ***  (0.72)  0.40 *** (0.12) 
 
-2.52 *** (0.70) 
 
    
 
        
Case study order 0.42 
 
(0.39)  
    
0.42 * (0.38) 
 
internet session -2.38 * (1.28)  
        
investor age -0.01 
 
(0.05)  
        
investor gender -1.14 
 
(1.03)  
        
venture capital -1.61 
 
(1.63)  
        
buyout -2.99 ** (1.42)  
        
expansion capital -1.86 
 
(1.38)  
        
SRI -3.35 
 
(2.39)  
        
ESG training 0.58 
 
(0.89)  
        
risk aversion -0.24   (0.47)                  
Obs. 330 
       
240 
   
Nb. investors 33 
       
24 
   
Wald chi2 35.83 ** 
          
LR chi2 
        
53.91 *** 
  
log_likelihood -128.98               -62.64       
a
 Effects of corporate policies on the investment decision (0 = don’t’ invest; 1 = invest) depending on their 
Factor (Env., Social or Gov.), Sign (Positive or Negative) and Quality (soft or hard), estimated as crossed effects.  
b  
Model 3 is a random effects logistic regression.  
c 
 Predictive margins are the predicted probability of deciding to invest knowing the Factor, Sign and Quality, 
assuming the random effect is zero (i.e. that it is an average investor). 
d 
 Model 3’ is a fixed effects logistic regression. 9 investors had all positive (invest) or null (don’t’ invest) 
outcome and were dropped from the sample. 
e
 All observations  = 1 when Factor =  Governance, Sign = Positive and Quality = Hard 
* p-value< 10%; ** p-value< 5%;  *** p-value< 1 
 
 
 
